Planning

Al lecture (Yoonsuck Choe): Material from Russel and Norvig (2nd ed.)


- 7.2, 7.7: Wumpus world (an example domain)
- 10.3: Situation calculus
- 11: Planning

Planning

- The task of coming up with a sequence of actions that will achieve a goal is called **planning**.
- Simple approaches:
 - Search-based
 - Logic-based
- Representation of states and actions become important issues.

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
Example Domain: Wumpus World



- Want to get to the gold and grab it.
- Want to avoid pits and the "wumpus".
- Clues: breeze near pits and stench near the wumpus.
- Other sensors: wall (bump), gold (glitter), kill (scream)
- Actions: move, grab, or shoot.

Wumpus World (WW)

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Performance measure

- +1000: picking up gold
- -1000: fall in a pit, or get eaten by the wumpus
- -1: each action taken
- -10: each arrow used


Evolution of Knowledge in WW



- Move from [1,1] to [2,1].
- Based on the sensory data (breeze), we can mark [2,2] and [3,1] as potential pits, but not [1,1] since we came from there and we already know there's no pit there.


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Inference in Wumpus World



- Knowledge Base: basic rules of the Wumpus World.
- Additional knowledge is added to the KB: facts you gather as you explore ([x,y] has stench, breeze, etc.)
- We can ask if a certain statement is a logical consequence of the KB: "There is a pit in [1,2]"


Evolution of Knowledge in WW



- Move back to [1,1] and then to [1,2]. At this point, the agent can infer that the wumpus is in [1,3]!
- Then move to [2,2] and then to [2,3] where the gold can be gound (glitter).



Inference in Wumpus World



KB: basic rules, plus [1,1] and [2,1] explored.

- α_1 = "There is no pit in [1,2]"
- α_2 = "There is no pit in [2,2]"
- Only α_1 follows from the KB.

Propositonal-logic-based Agent

- Query KB: Is there a Wumpus in [x,y]? Is there a pit in [x,y]?
- Add knowledge to KB (perceptual input): Breeze felt in [x,y], Stench detected in [x,y], etc.
- Decide which action to take (move where, etc.): Move to [x,y], grab gold, etc.

Note: here, there's only one goal, to grab the gold. Can we specify an arbitrary goal and derive a plan?

Problem: Propositions need to be explicit about location, e.g., $Breeze_{x,y}, Stench_{x,y}, \neg Wumpus_{x,y}.$

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Situation Calculus: Tasks

Projection:

Deduce the outcome of a given sequence of actions

• Planning:

Find a sequence of actions that achieves a desired effect. Example: Wumpus world

Initial: $At(Agent, [1, 1], S_0) \land At(G_1, [1, 2], S_0), \dots$ Goal: $\exists seq At(G_1, [1, 1], Result(seq, S_0))$

Situation Calculus

Make propositional-logic-based planner scalable.

• Situations: logical *terms* indicating a state. Example: In situation S_0 taking action a leads to situation S_1 :

 $S_1 = Result(a, S_0).$

Fluents: *funcitons* and *predicates* that vary from one situation to the next.
 Example: ¬*Holding*(*Gold*₁, *S*₀), *Age*(*Wumpus*)

Other stuff: Atemporal/eternal predicates $Gold(Gold_1)$, empty actions Result([], s) = s, sequence of actions Result([a|seq], s) = Result(seq, Result(a, s)).

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Describing Actions in Situation Calculus

Two axioms:

Possibility axiom: when it is possible to execute an action

Preconditions $\rightarrow Poss(a, s)$

• Effect axiom: What happens when a possible action is taken

 $Poss(a, s) \rightarrow$ Changes that result

Wumpus World: Axioms

Possibility axioms: Move, grab, release

 $\begin{aligned} At(Agent, x, s) \land Adjacent(x, y) &\to Poss(Go(x, y(, s) \\ Gold(g) \land At(Agent, x, s) \land At(g, x, s) &\to Poss(Grab(g), s) \\ Holding(g, s) &\to Poss(Release(g), s) \end{aligned}$

• Effect axioms: Move, Grab, Release

 $Poss(Go(x,y),s) \rightarrow At(Agent,y,Result(Go(x,y),s))$

 $Poss(Grab(g), s) \rightarrow Holding(g, Result(Grab(g), s))$

 $Poss(Release(g), s) \rightarrow \neg Holding(g, Result(Release(g), s))$

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Two Frame Problems

- Representational frame problem: Explained in the previous slide
- Inferential frame problem:

Projection of results of a t-step sequence of actions in time O(Et) (E is the number of effects, typically much less than F, the number of fluent predicates), rather than O(Ft) or O(AEt).

Frame Problem

• In the previous slide, we cannot deduce if the following can be proven (*G*₁ represents a particular lump of gold):

 $At(G_1, [1,1], Result([Go([1,1], [1,2]), Grab(G_1), Go([1,2], [1,1])], S_0)\\$

- It is because the effect axioms say only *what should change*, but not *what does not change when actions are taken*.
- Initial solution: Frame axioms

 $At(o, x, s) \land (o \neq Agent) \land \neg Holding(o, s)$ $\rightarrow At(o, x, Result(Go(y, z), s)).$

This says moving does not affect the gold when it is not held. Problem is that you need O(AF) such axioms for all (action, fluent) pair (A: num of actions, F: num of fluent predicates).

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Solving the Representational Frame Problem

 Consider how each fluent predicate evolves over time: Successor-state axioms Action is possible →
 (Fluent is true in result state ↔ Action's effect made it true
 ∨
 ∨

It was true before and action left it alone).

• Example:

$$\begin{split} Poss(a,s) &\to \\ (At(Agent,y,Result(a,s)) &\leftrightarrow a = Go(x,y) \\ &\lor (At(Agent,y,s) \land a \neq Go(y,z))). \end{split}$$

 Remaining issues: implicit effect (moving while holding something moves that something as well) – ramification problem. Can solve by using a more general succesor-state axiom.

Solving the Inferential Frame Problem

- Given a t-step plan p $(S_t = Result(p, S_0)),$ decide which fluents are true in $S_t.$
- We need to consider each of the F frame axiom of each time step t.
- Axioms have an average size of AE/F, we have an O(AEt) inferential work. Most of the work is done copying unchanged fluents from time step to time step.
- Solutions: use fluent calculus rather than situation calculus, or make the process more efficient.

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Other Formalisms

- Event calculus: Fluents hold at diffetent time points, not situations. Reasoning is done over time.
- Other constructs: generalized events (spatiotemporal), process, intervals, etc.
- Formal theory of belief: propositional attitude, reification, etc.

Solving the Inferential Frame Problem

- Typical frame axiom: $Poss(a, s) \rightarrow F_i(Result(a, s)) \leftrightarrow (a = A_1 \lor a = A_2...) \lor (F_i(s) \land (a \neq A_3) \land (a \neq A_4)...)$
- Several actions that make the fluent true and several that make the fluent false: Formalize using the predicate $PosEffect(a, F_i)$ and $NegEffect(a, F_i)$. $Poss(a, s) \rightarrow$ $F_i(Result(a, s)) \leftrightarrow PosEffect(a, F_i)$ $\vee [F_i(s) \wedge \neg NegEffect(a, F_i)]$ $PosEffect(A_1, F_i), PosEffect(A_1, F_i)$ $NegEffect(A_3, F_i), NegEffect(A_4, F_i)$ * This can be done efficiently: get current action, and fetch its effects, then update those fluents O(Et). 18

Truth Maintenance Systems

New facts inferred from the KB can turn out to be incorrect.

- Let's say P was derived in the KB and later it was found that $\neg P$.
- Adding $\neg P$ to the KB will invalidate the entire KB, so P should be removed (Retract(KB, P)).
- Care needs to be taken since other facts in the KB may have been derived from *P*, etc.
- Truth maintenance systems are designed to handle these complications.

Planning Approaches

- State-space search: forward or backward.
- Heuristic search: subgoal independence assumption.
- Partial-order planning: utilize problem decomposition. Can place two actions into a plan without specifying the order. Several different total order plans can be constructed from partial order plans.

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